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“Capital knows no county.” George Harvey (1917) 
 “… capital never solves its crisis tendencies; it merely moves them around.” David Harvey (2014, 11) 
Introduction 
Capitalist development is inherently combined, uneven and crisis prone; it has been so from the 
outset, and will remain so. There is widespread agreement on this point: there are very few uneven 
development deniers. All the empirical evidence – and there is a great deal of it – points to that 
conclusion, that the fates of industries and places, at varied spatial scales, are linked as some 
prosper and grow while others decline. On the other hand, there is widespread disagreement as to 
why this is the case. There is a wide variety of competing theoretical perspectives as to why 
development is spatially uneven, as to how best to theorise uneven development and adjudicate 
among competing theoretical perspectives and agree which gives the greatest explanatory purchase. 
As will become clear, my own preference is for a heterodox political-economy approach, grounded 
in Marxian political economy, as this provides the most powerful account of the systemic character 
of capitalist development as combined and uneven (for example, see Harvey, 1982; 2014; Hudson, 
2001). What has undeniably changed over time is the form of that uneven development, at varying 
spatial scales. The recent emergence of the economies of the so-called rising powers – exemplified 
by the premier league of the BRICs (originally four, Brazil, India, Russia, China, but joined by South 
Africa in 2010 in a “symbolic political initiative”: Degaut, 2015, 8) and second division of the MINTs 
(Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey) for example – has led to claims about a fundamental shift in 
global economic geography. It is worth noting, however, that while they share some features in 
common, these are far from homogeneous groupings (Sidaway, 2012) and these labels can be seen 
as no more than a marketing ploy, a brand that has its origins in Goldman Sachs, the term coined in 
2001 by Jim O’Neil to denote a group of national economies in which the national growth rate 
exceeded that of the G7 (Fourcade, 2013; see also Table 1). However, despite their differing political 
economies the BRICS also began to act collaboratively, informally from 2006 and then formally via 
annual summits from 2009 as they sought to become a major actor in the global political-economy, 
although these efforts were hampered by the heterogeneous character of its members1. More 
fundamentally, the emergence of the rising powers is neither more nor less than simply one facet of 
the latest expression of the process of combined and uneven development at the global scale (for 
example, see Arrighi, 2008; 2010; Stephen, 2014). How and why the global economic geography 
developed as it did in this way, and with what implications and effects, is the focus of this paper. 
How long this spatial pattern will persist remains a matter for conjecture and future history. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows, recognising that capitalist development is always a 
process of combined and uneven development, and focussing on the changing forms of the 
international division of labour and geographies of the global economy. It situates the emergence of 
the rising powers in the context of the latest phase of combined and uneven development. 
Following a brief of discussion of the Old International Division of Labour and the gradual transition 
to a New International Division of Labour characterised by a ‘global shift’ in the location of 
manufacturing activity in particular from the 1970s, it discusses more fully the transition to a ‘new’ 
                                                          
1 In 2006 Goldman Sachs created an in-house fund dedicated to the BRICS. In September 2015 it quietly closed 
its BRICs Fund, merging it with an all-purpose emerging markets fund, indicative of the changing perceptions of 
the map of global investment opportunities and the language used to describe it.  
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New International Division of Labour, characterised by the variable influence of neo-liberalism and a 
much more extensive and varied shift of economic activities, involving new North-South, South-
North and South-South relationships and flows. The emergence of the rising powers has to be 
situated in the context of, and as a constituent moment of, this ‘new’ New International Division of 
Labour and the latest phase of combined and uneven development. One result of this was to overlay 
an East-West dimension onto the existing North-South divisions in the global economy. In seeking to 
understand why this change occurred, I focus particular attention on changes in transport and 
communication technologies, corporate strategies, state strategies and the interrelations among 
them. As well as discussing these macro-scale spatial changes, I discuss the related new patterns of 
intra-national uneven spatial development within the rising powers and more generally issues of 
growing socio-spatial inequality, characterised as the emergence of a Fourth World. In part related 
to burgeoning inequality, I also discuss the growing significance of illegality which has become 
structurally inscribed into this latest phase of capitalist development in North and South, East and 
West. I conclude with some rather speculative remarks as to how the geography of the global 
economy might change in future.       
Changing global geographies of economies 
Let me begin with a quick sketch – because they’re well known - of the changing maps of global 
uneven development. The Old International Division of Labour was based upon the concentration of 
industrial production in the core developed territories of Europe and north America, the old 
workshops of the world, importing raw materials and labour from, and exporting finished products 
to, the underdeveloped peripheries of colonies and otherwise dependent territories. The 
development of the former was intimately linked to the underdevelopment of the latter, as Andre 
Gunder Frank (1966) and others (for example, Cockcroft et al, 1972) cogently argued. There were, 
however, some important developments that began to disturb this spatial pattern. On the one hand, 
there was the emergence of the Communist bloc from 1917 and 1949 as a space denied to capital. 
On the other hand, new centres of industrial growth (re)emerged with the resurgence of Japan from 
the 1950s and the rise of the East Asian Little Tigers and other late industrialising countries such as 
South Korea from the 1960s (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Woo Cummings, 1999), developments 
that presaged much greater changes to come. Acknowledging these changes, however, it remains 
the case that the geography of the Old International Division of Labour broadly continued during the 
long post-WWII boom. Industrial production continued to be concentrated in those countries that 
had been at the core of the capitalist industrialisation process, often sucking in labour in the form of 
temporary migrant workers from more peripheral countries (from southern Europe and the 
Mediterranean to Germany, from Mexico to the USA, for example).  
From about 1970, however, this geography of the capitalist economy began to change in significant 
ways. Peter Dicken (2011) memorably characterised this change as a ‘global shift’, a transition from 
the Old International Division of Labour to a New International Division of Labour (paradigmatically 
described in Fröbel et al, 1980). In very general terms, the global North, the location of the 
foundational centres of capitalist industrial production, became increasingly deindustrialised. 
Industrial capital was devalorised in situ, capacity closed (and much of it physically destroyed) and 
employment fell significantly. Conversely, routine factory production and manufacturing value 
creation were re-located to cheaper production locations, initially those adjacent to or on the fringes 
of the core areas (for example, from northern Europe to southern Europe and north Africa). Rather 
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than importing migrant labour from them, capital re-located production to these countries. Although 
perhaps not obvious at the time, this marked the beginning of a fundamental shift in the centre of 
gravity of the global economy. 
This New International Division of Labour in turn was the precursor of a ‘new’ New International 
Division of Labour – or perhaps New International Division of Labour, Mark 2 - increasingly involving 
off-shoring routine activities to more distant locations, the new workshops of the world, offering still 
lower unit labour and production costs (Urry, 2014) and deeply integrated into global production 
networks and value chains.  As a result factory production increasingly expanded in (parts of) the 
global South, but it did so alongside more established activities of primary commodity production 
and export-oriented resource extraction. Indeed, these latter activities often expanded as a result of 
a new wave of accumulation by dispossession, reinforcing the role of some parts of both the South 
and also former state socialist states of the East, notably Russia (Rutland, 2103), as suppliers of key 
raw materials. In contrast to the previous pattern, however, this not only involved supplying 
economies in the North but also increasingly supplying other parts of the industrialising South. An 
expanding variety of natural materials was transformed from part of the commons to become 
commodified private property, as a result of a variety of mechanisms ranging from legal process to 
force and violence, and with private property ownership then protected by IPR and other legislation 
(Hadjimichalis, 2014; Harvey, 2014). A corollary of these developments was to undermine the basis 
of many local economies in the South previously organised through non-capitalist social relations, 
although it is important to recognise these were often characterised by widespread poverty, a 
consequence of them delivering inadequate levels of material well-being, and as such made rural to 
urban migrations employment in new industries an attractive proposition.   
Furthermore, reflecting this radical change in what was produced where, this ‘new’ New 
International Division of Labour became characterised by much more complex flows of commodities 
and capital and new patterns of inter-relations among a much greater range of countries in the neo-
liberalising global economy as regulations on capital, commodity and trade flows were loosened 
(changes that are caught in part in the burgeoning literatures on global commodity chains, global 
value chains and global production networks; Smith et al, 2002; Hudson, 2008; Yeung and Coe, 
2105). Indeed, in many respects there was a reversal of the earlier trade patterns of the Old 
International Division of Labour. Manufactured goods, especially consumer goods, were increasingly 
exported from some of the rising powers to the North, in part funded via government surpluses 
generated by undervalued currencies and lent from South to North, especially China to the USA. At 
the same time, there were increased flows of wastes, commodities – ranging from clothing to 
computers to ships - that had reached the end of their socially useful lives in the North and were 
then transported to locations in the South, where many of them had originally been produced, for 
disassembly, re-cycling and re-valorisation and re-entry into the production process (Langewiesche, 
2004; Lepawsky and Billah, 2011; Gregson et al, 2010; 2012). There were also major flows of 
investment from some countries in the South to other parts of the world in search of food and 
industrial raw materials such as coal, iron ore, and metals required for the production of PCs, tablets 
and mobile phones. This search extended to parts of both the global South and global North (for 
example, Chinese investments in Africa and Australia). Taken together, these changes were 
symptomatic of “a slow tectonic shift in the power relations and geopolitical configuration of the 
global economy” (Harvey, 2014, 123). And key to this tectonic shift was the role of the rising powers, 
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but above all the post-1978 rise of China with its distinctive combination of capitalist production, 
State-led industrialisation and control by the Communist Party.  
This emerging locational pattern was further shaped by the post-2007 financial and then more 
general economic crisis, a key effect of which was further to emphasise the new centrality of China 
to the global accumulation process. While typically represented as a global crisis, however, this is at 
best a partial truth. There was certainly a decline in industrial employment and output in much of 
the North, but there was continued growth in industrialising countries in the South, above all China 
(Table 1). The net effect of these contrasting trends was that at the global level, growth remained 
around 3% per annum, even in the period 2007-9 when the effects of the crisis were most sharply 
felt. This global average therefore disguised a combination of growth in the rising powers and some 
other countries in the South and decline in the advanced capitalist economies of the North, which 
subsequently grew at best at less than 1% per annum. Crucially, the annual growth rate in China 
never fell below 9% and recovered rapidly and settled at around 10% per annum. The accumulation 
of massive surpluses, allied to strong central government control, allowed the Chinese government 
to put in place a substantial stimulus package (centred on investment in infrastructure and loosening 
bank credit). This bolstered the national economic growth rate and further enhanced the 
significance of the Chinese economy to accumulation globally. Even so, by 2014/5 the annual growth 
in China had slowed to around 7% - still a significant rate of expansion, far in excess of anything in 
the national economies of the North - but the lowest rate for 25 years. This decline was sufficient to 
trigger turmoil on global stock markets and the collapse of many commodity prices, as Chinese 
manufacturing exports fell and the investment boom came to an abrupt end, and a slow-down in the 
already weak growth rate of many other capitalist economies, in both North and South. This slow-
down in turn had impacts back on the Chinese economy. For example, while Chinese LCD (liquid 
crystal display) manufacturers continued to expand capacity and output, partly as a result of 
government subsidies, demand for LCD TVs, particularly in Russia, Brazil and other emerging 
economies, failed to grow as expected because of currency depreciation and slow economic 
recovery – in turn in part a result of declining exports because of the fall in demand for commodities 
as the Chinese economy slowed - so that the gap between supply and demand expanded (EET Asia, 
2016). One consequence of this pattern of differential but increasingly inter-related but uneven 
decline and growth was to complicate a representation of the global economy in terms of North 
versus South as this was increasingly overlain by the uneven development of links among the 
countries of the South as well as a growing reconfiguration of links between East and West.  
The ‘new’ New International Division of Labour: coming to terms with the changing geography of 
the world economy 
How do we begin to understand this changing economic geography and grasp how and why this 
particular global shift occurred? The key to answering these questions and understanding these 
changes lies in the interrelationships among and between corporate and state strategies, enabled 
and to a degree underpinned by changes in production, transport and communication technologies.  
The key proximate driver of this global shift was the changing investment strategies of major MNCs 
based in the North, especially those involved in producing goods for final consumer markets, as they 
increasingly switched from being direct producers of these material commodities to become brand 
managers contracting routine production to others. Managing brands and capturing and protecting 
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IPR as a source of monopoly rents became increasingly important sources of revenue and profit for 
these companies (Pike, 2013). This radical change in strategy also had major implications for 
geographies of production. One dimension of these changes was that these companies further 
concentrated knowledge-intensive activities – new high-value added, knowledge-intensive 
production and key strategic decision making functions, R&D, and finance more generally - in their 
home economies, where it was feasible to do so. This was not always the case, however: for 
example, a condition of being able to invest in China was often to share some strategic information 
with local partners in joint ventures. More generally, these changes were part of a broader 
significant structural change in the advanced economies of the North as they became increasingly 
commercialised and financialised, more focussed upon distribution and retailing and in creating 
circuits of fictitious capital, extracting rents of various sorts, developing innovative (but often very 
risky) financial products and financial services, often in Offshore Tax Havens (discussed further later), 
and engaging in land and property speculation. For example, derivatives contracts grew ten-fold in 
the decade up to 2007-8, reaching a colossal US$500 trillion per annum, many times greater than 
annual global GDP (Urry, 2014, 175). Furthermore, these were all activities that required workers 
with very different technical and social skills as compared to those required for manual work in 
factories and mines, with financial services and the production of the diverse innovative financial 
products in particular requiring increased amounts of “symbolic labour” (Reich, 1992). 
Financialisation was also closely linked to the expansion of credit and debt as part of a socially-
selective strategic policy response to offset falling purchasing power as a consequence of labour 
market restructuring and the resultant decline in effective demand in the North as industrial 
employment there fell and unemployment there rose.  Linked to these structural changes in the 
economies of the North, major capitalist interests began to exercise greater influence over the fiscal 
policies of national states and supra-national bodies such as the IMF and World Bank, tilting the 
balance in policy formulation significantly towards their interests, enhancing the influence of capital, 
particularly financial capital, and undermining the interests of organised labour and the wider mass 
of the population.     
For another dimension of the changing geography of the global economy as a result of the change in 
MNC strategies was that the former centres of industrial production in the North – those countries 
that once were the workshops of the world - became increasingly deindustrialised, characterised by 
long-term structural unemployment, worklessness and the associated problems of growing 
inequality, ill-health and poverty that this brought. As new opportunities for profitable production 
opened up elsewhere, productive activity in the North was closed down as routine component 
production and assembly was off-shored – initially via tentative moves into southern Europe (the 
first cut New International Division of Labour) and somewhat later Central and Eastern Europe, but 
increasingly into the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India but especially China after 1978), and then to a lesser 
extent the MINT countries (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey) as well as others such as Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, South Africa and Vietnam (thus shaping the ‘new’ New International Division of Labour). 
As a result China alone now has some 85 million manufacturing jobs. Such investment was heavily 
oriented towards export, with significant effects on the structure of national economies: in perhaps 
the paradigmatic case, some 40% of Chinese GDP became dependent on exports, the majority of 
which were undertaken by foreign multinationals (Stephen, 2014, 925).  
Revised version of paper presented at the AAG March 2016 San Francisco,  
To be submitted to Area Development and Policy 
 
7 
 
Compared to those of the North, these countries offered particularly attractive locations in which to 
relocate much routine production, enabling production costs to be greatly reduced. There were four 
reasons for this. First, they provided massive amounts of much cheaper, more malleable and more 
productive labour (Table 2), workers with little or no experience of factory work, available in 
minimally regulated and often deeply segmented labour markets and workplaces. As a result 
companies were able to increase the rate of exploitation and the production of both absolute and 
relative surplus-value. Secondly, these countries imposed weak constraints on pollution and 
environmental destruction, with much more permissive regulatory regimes and minimal 
environmental standards as compared to the countries of the North. Thirdly, they typically provide a 
variety of special economic zones, “spaces of exception” in which even the minimum labour market, 
workplace and environmental regulatory standards are suspended; in addition generous tax breaks 
and financial incentives are often provided to entice inward investment. Fourthly, they made 
significant investments in high quality infrastructure in transport, logistics and communications 
systems, crucial to enable the exporting and importing of commodities and maintaining effective 
links with other nodes in globally distributed production systems. The net effect of these labour 
market, workplace and environmental conditions was to enable unit production costs to be greatly 
reduced and profits to be increased, with profits further enhanced by sub-contracting work to local 
suppliers who were desperate to win contracts. As a result, there was a selective industrialisation of 
countries in the South and the growth of factory employment there, as national governments 
competed to attract foreign investment and sought to encourage industrialisation as part of their 
economic development policies. 
These changes in corporate strategy therefore led to the creation of increasingly complex spatial 
divisions of labour and supply chains, stretching over many locations (reflected in part in the 
literatures on global commodity chains, global value chains and global production networks), so that 
some 60% of international trade in fact became intra-company flows. This spatial reorganisation 
brought great advantages to capital in terms of cutting unit production costs and increasing profits. 
But it also created potential new risks for capital as such supply chains are vulnerable to disruption, 
especially when they are organised on just-in-time principles and stretched over great distances. A 
strike in one factory or a labour dispute in one port, an earthquake or storm in one country 
interrupting the flow of components to final assembly plants and so on, can lead to the whole 
production system and value creation process grinding to a halt. Companies can to a degree mitigate 
such risks via dual or multi-sourcing strategies but this only reduces rather than eliminates the risks 
of disruption to production and profits. Moreover, these global systems of production and trade 
crucially depended on the availability of (cheap) oil. While the global market is currently again awash 
with cheap oil, the price will inevitably rise significantly again and in addition oil supplies remain 
potentially vulnerable to interruptions in supply because of choke points in trade routes (such as the 
Straits of Hormuz and Malacca), the disruption to production because of adverse extreme weather 
conditions (as with hurricane Katrina in 2005) or explosions at production sites (as with BP’s 
Deepwater Horizon rig in the Gulf  of Mexico in 2010). 
This was a more complex shift than just one of routine factory production of consumer goods for 
export, however. Within the Old International Division of Labour many former colonies and 
dependent territories had embarked on industrialisation strategies based upon import substitution 
and policies to encourage national production of basic industrial materials such as chemicals and 
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steel. In certain respects this pattern was reinforced as China in particular developed basic industrial 
capacity through monopolistic State-owned enterprises in a range of “pillar industries”, distributed 
across the (allegedly) commanding heights of the economy. One reflection of this drive to develop 
indigenous capacity was the disassembly of major steel plants in western Europe and their 
reassembly in parts of China as a way of relatively quickly boosting productive capacity there 
(Hudson and Swanton, 2012). China now accounts for more than half of global steel production, in 
excess of 800 MT annually (much of which is now exported). More generally, expansion of capacity 
in basic metals and bulk chemical production in the South, and growing exports from South to North, 
led to capacity closures in these industries in the North as global shifts became increasingly 
generalised across the industrial economy and increasingly affected sectors in Department I as well 
as Department II of production.  
Furthermore, as the economies of the BRICs, MINTs and some other industrialising countries in the 
South developed, a new middle class emerged and the strategies of major MNCs shifted as they 
sought to create and penetrate new markets for consumer goods in these countries, both goods 
those produced there (often via joint ventures to gain market access) but also high-end luxury 
brands produced in and imported from the North (Stephen, 2014, 925). Thus the pattern of 
international trade further shifted somewhat, as did the balance of MNC production within the rising 
powers as between domestic and export markets. There was also evidence of a limited re-location 
from North to South of some service and knowledge-management functions, especially back-office 
and business process operations, and of lower level R&D to Bangalore and other locations in India, 
as well as other parts of south east Asia, in response to the availability of substantial amounts of 
technically qualified and skilled cheap labour with good English language competence (Luce, 2011). 
In short, the pattern of inward investment from companies in the North to these countries in the 
South became increasingly varied, in terms of location, sectors and activities within them. 
These were not simply uni-directional flows, however. There were also counter-tendencies and the 
emergence of flows of foreign direct investment among BRICs and MINTs and among other countries 
in the global South, as well as reverse investment flows from the global South into the North. For 
example, there have been major investments into automobiles (TATA Jaguar and Land Rover from 
Ford) and steel production (Mittal acquiring Acelor, TATA acquiring the integrated steelworks of 
Corus at Ijmuiden, Port Talbot and Scunthorpe, the Thai company SSI acquiring TATA’s basic steel 
production facilities at Redcar on Teesside), while there were various Chinese investments into a 
wide range of industries in the North spanning services and manufacturing, including the Swiss 
agribusiness Syngenta and Italian tyre maker Pirelli by ChemChina, and the USA electronics 
distributor Ingram Micro, USA aircraft lessor Avalon Holdings and Swissport  by the HNA Group. 
Other Chinese investments were politically sensitive: for example major investments into water 
supply and the generation of electricity by nuclear power stations in the UK. By the first quarter of 
2016, Chinese firms accounted for one sixth of all global merger and acquisition activity (Massoudi et 
al, 2016). On the back of these deals, a small number of politically-connected Chines business 
leaders - such as Anbang Insurance’s Wu Xiaonhui, ChemChina’s Ren Jianxin and HNA Group’s Chen 
Feng -  joined an elite club of global deal makers: those capable of consecutive billion-dollar deals in 
a matter of months (Weinland et al, 2016).  
The flow of investment from South to North was driven by four motives, and especially by China and 
India. First, an imperative for aspiring MNCs from the South to seek access to more sophisticated 
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production technologies and selectively to penetrate more mature markets and develop capacity to 
serve their own growing consumer markets, via the acquisition of the assets of companies in the 
North. This could take prima facie surprising forms: for example to revive declining industrial 
districts in the Third Italy such as clothing and textile production in Prato, linked to Chinese 
migration to the town (the reasons for decline of these industrial districts are discussed below).  
Second, it was driven by the desire of some national states in the South to gain greater influence on 
and leverage over Northern economies. However, as the experiences of steel production in the UK 
revealed, such investments could be short-lived, as competition among producers from rising 
powers led to both SSI and TATA closing steel production capacity as the market was flooded with 
imports of semi-finished slabs from China as the big steel producers there switched to exporting 
their product. Thirdly, it was facilitated by the easy availability of credit, especially in China from 
state banks that regarded foreign investment as safer than investment in the domestic economy 
(Massoudi et al, 2016). Fourthly, and relatedly, it reflected the strategic accumulation of substantial 
currency reserves and a decline in domestic investment opportunities, coupled with a strong desire, 
especially by the Chinese government, to pull out of US Treasuries as the destination of its surplus 
and perhaps make the yuan an alternative to the dollar for international trade within the South 
(Nölte et al, 2015, 560).  
In summary, these changing patterns of spatially uneven development were linked to a more 
complex pattern of flows, not just from North to South but within the South and from South to 
North through various circuits and flows of capital, and not just via the more established channel of 
flows of migrant labour.  
What was it that enabled, facilitated and encouraged these changes in corporate strategy and 
economic geographies? The short answer to this question is a combination of (geo)political and 
technological changes. First of all, as well as innovations in production technologies, there were 
innovations in information and communication technologies, enabling global coordination of 
economic activities in diverse locations, and in transport, such as air travel with new wide-bodied 
jets for cargo as well as people, new bulk carriers for oil, iron ore, grain and other bulk commodities 
but especially new container vessels and specialised ships for transporting vehicles, crucial to the 
growth of the mass trade in consumer goods. The significance of containerisation in enabling the 
global shift in production cannot be over-estimated: some 90% of global trade is containerised 
(Levinson, 2008). It is also worth noting that containerisation greatly facilitated the trade in illegal 
substances and commodities, mainly from South to North, since the volume of trade in containers 
made it impossible to monitor these effectively to detect illegal commodities smuggled in them: the 
wider significance of the illegal is further discussed below. Related to these changes in transport and 
communication technologies, there were major fixed capital investments in new infrastructure 
capacity in airports, seaports, especially for containers, and logistics and distribution centres and 
systems, typically reinforcing existing or emerging patterns of uneven development.  
Secondly, and crucially, there were major political changes in the North, notably the growing 
influence of neo-liberalisation following the ending of the Bretton Woods agreement in the early 
1970s. At the risk of over-simplification, up to 1970s the advanced capitalist economies can be 
characterised as relatively closed, with fixed currency exchange rates, and limited international flows 
of capital and international competition. National states pursued their own economic and fiscal 
policies, which were open to some influence from organised labour and leftist (generally social–
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democratic) political parties. From the late 1970s, especially in the USA and UK but to varying 
extents in other major capitalist states in the North, there was a tendential shift to a neo-liberal 
state. This involved major changes in discourse and practice, not least a fundamental change from 
state responsibility for the provision of key public services, critical infrastructures and key industrial 
materials (thus underwriting the costs of elements of variable, fixed and constant capital 
respectively) to markets, increasingly understood as global markets, as the allocative and steering 
mechanism. Furthermore, these were increasingly lightly regulated markets, while currency 
exchange rates fluctuated in response to market pressures. More generally, neo-liberalisation was 
predicated on a shift from reliance upon the state to “responsibilising” individuals – both people and 
corporations - for their own welfare and well-being via their actions as economic actors in markets, 
rationally pursuing their own self-interest.  
It is, however, important to emphasise that this was a tendential shift. Not all national states 
embraced neo-liberalism with the same degree of enthusiasm. Different national states, with varying 
political priorities, developed particular forms of political economy and state forms, with varying 
degrees of neo-liberal influence. While the UK and USA can be seen as located at one end of a 
spectrum of enthusiasm for the alleged benefits of neo-liberalisation, the extent to which other 
advanced states in the North embraced neo-liberalism varied, with a greater degree of resistance to 
its attractions in Germany and most of the Nordic states, for example.  Nevertheless, while it was a 
tendential development, it did (re)open up new spaces for capital accumulation within the North, 
while loosening or abolishing regulations on capital movements out of national territories there - in 
the UK in 1979, the USA in 1980, and in France and Germany soon afterwards - so that capital was 
free to search out possibilities for profit over a much greater area of the globe.  
Thirdly, there were major geo-political changes in the former USSR and its satellite states in central 
and eastern Europe and in much of the global South, which also involved rejecting autarky and 
embracing neo-liberal doctrine. As among the national states of the North, however, national states 
in the South and East absorbed and adapted neo-liberalising tendencies and the strictures of the 
Washington Consensus to varying degrees and in varying ways. This differential adoption and 
adaptation reflected political priorities and powers, with different states having very differing 
degrees of room for manoeuvre. While many of the states of central and eastern Europe eagerly 
embraced the Northern model of a neo-liberal market economy and a representative democratic 
politics, others chose a different path. For example, despite the post-Yeltsin changes, Russia had at 
best a pale shadow of a democratic politics, coupled with poorly developed markets and a faltering 
economy (Unger and Cui, 1994; Rutland, 2013). As Degaut (2015, 12) puts it, “ … it [Russia] is in fact 
a corruption-plagued state run by an authoritarian oligarchy averse to free speech and civil 
liberties”. In contrast, Brazil and India, both western-style multiparty democracies in the South, 
nonetheless retained a strong, though differing, role for the state in economic policy (Ban, 2013; 
Mukherji, 2013).  
For some of the more powerful states such as China and India - coupled together in popular business 
discourse as Chindia: Engardio, 2007 - which were not dependent upon loans from the IMF or World 
Bank, partially and selectively engaging with the neo-liberal agenda can be seen as the least-worst 
available option in pursuit of national economic development and growth in the context of a 
globalising economy, adopting some elements but rejecting others of the neo-liberal agenda. For 
example, China favoured free trade and accepted membership of the World Trade Organisation 
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without subscribing to its deep integration agenda (Nölte et al, 2015, 561) and refused to liberalise 
its financial sector, despite continuing pressure from the IMF and World Bank. More generally China 
has pursued a very different approach. Its unique mixture of elements of continuing legacies its 
communist history and public ownership of land and strategic industries controlled by State-Owned 
Enterprises with selective inward investment by foreign MNCs and considerable marketization of the 
economy has stimulated a vibrant debate as to how it is most appropriately conceptualised, 
confounding attempts to contain it within existing classifications of developing economies. The 
Chinese project has been variously described both as a form of State capitalism and as the pursuit of 
a socialist market economy. Of these, the latter, combining social ownership of the means of 
production and an active developmentalist local state with private ownership and a market 
economy, is the most appropriate (Bowles and Dang, 1994; Peck and Zhang, 2013). Furthermore, it 
has been suggested that the prominence of the local state has given rise to several territorially-
defined “indigenous” capitalisms within China (Zhang and Peck, 2013). It may therefore be most 
appropriately regarded as a sui generis case, with no precedent.  
However it is conceptualised, the Chinese case, along with those of other emerging economies in the 
South vividly demonstrates that economic growth via the adoption of a market economy, including 
some key aspects of capitalist social relations, notably the wage relation and a degree of private 
ownership, does not depend upon a system of representative democratic politics (Szelény, 2015). 
This had been demonstrated by the earlier economic success of the East Asian Little Tigers, driven 
initially by “hard states” grounded in political authoritarianism, a grounding that became 
increasingly problematic, however, as economies developed and demands for democratisation grew 
(Unger and Cui, 1994, 85). Indeed, more generally national states in the South demonstrated a 
variety of governance models, different from those that characterised the North, recognising that 
these also varied – compare Germany, Japan and the USA for example. While engaging to varying 
degrees with aspects of neo-liberalisation and often displaying limited enthusiasm for neo-liberal 
principles of globalising economic governance (Stephen, 2014), the “State-permeated market 
economies” (Nölke et al, 2015) of Brazil, China and India in particular retained a crucial role for the 
state, in this way providing sufficient governance capacity to enable and facilitate a degree of 
economic development and progress and ensure the smooth reproduction of economic processes in 
general. As a result, national states were typically prominent institutions promoting industrial 
development in those countries in the South that were successful in developing an industrial 
economy. Stephens (2014, 914, emphasis in original), for example, refers to the BRICs as examples of 
“integrated state capitalism, ... under the guidance of strong state classes” but often, especially in 
Brazil, China and India, with an enduring influence of interpersonal relations and informal social 
networks (Stephen, 214, 926). Crucially, however, and “in contradistinction to liberal heartland 
capitalism, it is state classes rather than autonomous bourgeoisies who guide BRICs’ state-society 
relations, using the state as a major lever of development”, for example via Sovereign Wealth Funds 
(Stephen, 2014, 928-9). More generally, the end result of these varying development trajectories can 
indeed be seen as co-existing varieties of capitalism, but displaying a greater variety than registered 
in foundational “varieties of capitalism” literature, with its two ideal-typical dichotomous cases of 
liberal market and coordinated market national economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001). However, there 
are more recent and more nuanced approaches to varieties of capitalism, recognising a greater 
variety of types of capitalist economy, and the significance of different spatial scales and a move to 
multi-level governance (for example, see many of the contributions to Lane and Wood, 2012). More 
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promisingly still, there are those who propose approaches that are more aligned with a focus on 
“variegated capitalisms” (Peck and Theodore, 2007) rather “varieties of capitalism” (for example, 
Jessop, 2012). 
In summary, then the BRICs were thus able to engage willingly but selectively with the propositions 
of the so-called (post)Washington consensus and neo-liberalising tendencies, editing them in various 
ways to engineer compatibility with national circumstances and so create a variety of hybrid 
approaches, the linking common feature of which was a more prominent role for the national state. 
Others adopted neo-liberal policies more comprehensively but unwillingly and under duress as a 
result of pressure from the IMF, World Bank and other creditors to adopt structural adjustment 
measures. This was particularly the case with many other smaller countries in the South, notably in 
Africa and Latin America that were politically and economically peripheral. As a result of these 
various changes, new spaces became available for capital in which to invest. The post-1978 changes 
in China were a pivotal moment in this process while political and policy change elsewhere (in 
Russia, South Africa, India and Brazil for example) also opened up new spaces of opportunity for 
capital, albeit that these states generally retained significant capital controls and acted as 
gatekeepers for transnational capital’s access to their territories.  
The combination of geo-political changes and the growing adoption of neo-liberal policy positions in 
many states in the peripheral East and South led to some combination of three outcomes: first, it led 
to an ending of closure to capital and capitalism(s); secondly, it opened the door to greater inward 
foreign direct investment, although the significance of this inward investment to the receiving 
economies depended on their size and the significance of the domestic market in state economic 
policy; and thirdly, it led to a switch in emphasis in national state industrialisation policies to export-
platform, especially in the weaker peripheral economies. However, national states varied in their 
bargaining power and those with bigger national economies and greater political leverage were 
better placed to be more selective and negotiate over the scale and composition of inward 
investment. Crucially, those national states with bigger economies - China, India, and Brazil - could 
use such inward investment as a mechanism to import foreign technology to facilitate economic 
development.  As noted earlier, however, the growth in export-oriented foreign direct investment 
did not necessarily mean an abandonment of concern with import-substitution and the national 
market (Nölke et al, 2015). On the contrary, especially in the bigger economies - Brazil, China, India, 
in which the domestic market was significant - on occasion it involved the growth of domestic 
capacity and the promotion by the State of national champions, either by selective support of 
national private sector firms or direct investment in state enterprises. This support was focussed on 
strategically significant sectors producing key inputs to industrial production processes, such as 
chemicals, coal, and steel and new and/or more sophisticated consumer goods both for export and 
for expanding national markets, increasingly segmented as a middle class with significant disposable 
income emerged. At the same time as they began to develop their own technologies via national 
champions in specific sectors, for example in China in mobile telephony and high-speed rail. The net 
result of these varied changes was therefore often to create more complex and more varied national 
economic structures, although often not to the intended extent. 
Intra-national change in the context of the ‘new’ New International Division of Labour 
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Capitalist development is characterised by spatially uneven development at differing scales. Within 
the rising powers, the BRICs and MINTS and other newly industrialising countries, growth linked to 
their changed place in the ‘new’ New International Division of Labour has been spatially very 
uneven, creating new or enhancing existing intra-national differences in economic structure and 
performance, with the emergence of new centres of industrial growth and capital accumulation, 
often linked to a rescaling of governance and devolution to sub-national scales. These new growth 
centres are frequently coastal locations, forming the points of articulation between national and 
global economies, linked to the export orientation of industrialisation. They often have greater 
functional links to overseas economies than to each other as local economic development 
organisations have sought to insert their territories into transnational production and investment 
networks (for example, see Hameiri and Jones, 2016). In addition, there were also coastal places 
focussed on the import and re-cycling of wastes from the North, for example ships at Alang in India 
and Chittagong in Bangladesh, e-wastes at Guiyu in China (Urry, 2014, 129-30). Re-cycling activities 
in such places provided a mixture of consumer goods for local people and material inputs for further 
industrial production in the South (Gregson et al, 2010; 2012).  
Typically these new centres of industrial growth and economic activity were also linked to new 
patterns of intra-national migration and (mega) urbanisation within the rising powers, often on an 
unprecedented scale. This has involved a tidal wave of land grabs and the conversion of rural 
dwellers, previously engaged in agriculture, often on a subsistence basis, from a latent labour 
reserve to become part of a proletarianised factory labour force. This is vividly illustrated by China 
(Walker and Buck, 2007), with land grabs dispossessing more than 50 million famers, with land for 
new industrial parks, enterprise zones and new cities largely requisitioned from peasants (Peck and 
Zhang, 2013, 377). As well as these relatively short distance flows of migrant labour from the 
countryside to the cities, there were unprecedented long-distance flows, over thousands of 
kilometres, from the rural west to the urbanising and industrialising eastern coastal belt. While there 
has been rapid growth on this coastal strip, there was much slower growth inland, although this is 
now to a degree changing as a result of public policy initiatives. Inland cities and provinces have 
offered particularly attractive deals to foreign investors as they seek to shift growth westwards to 
selected inland locations so that they become nodes in spatially distributed production networks. 
Nevertheless, despite these developments China remains profoundly marked by sharp regional 
contrasts and a deep urban/rural divide, although with considerable variation in approaches to local 
economic development in both rural and urban areas. Similar tendencies of uneven intra-national 
development and rescaling of governance can be observed in the other rising powers of Brazil, India, 
Russia and South Africa (Hameiri and Jones, 2016). 
Conversely in north America, western Europe, and Australia there is widespread evidence of the 
collapse of former core regions of industrial production; here deindustrialisation is the watchword. 
In very general terms, many of those cities and regions that had been the foundational centres of 
capitalist industrial production in the North became deindustrialised, as industrial capital was 
devalorised, productive capacity closed (and much of it physically destroyed) and employment fell 
significantly as unemployment and worklessness rose sharply. This affected both major industrial 
conurbations (such as Detroit and the Ruhr) and mono-industrial towns (coal mining settlements and 
steel towns such as Youngstown, Consett, and Longwy: Beynon et al, 1991; Hudson and Sadler, 
1989). Furthermore the effects of industrial decline have spread into more recently industrialised 
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areas of southern and central and eastern Europe, including the much-lauded success stories of the 
industrial districts of the Third Italy and other parts of southern Europe, rendered uncompetitive, 
undercut by much lower production costs, especially for labour, in the rising powers of the BRICs and 
MINTs (Hudson, 2003).  
However, some places in these countries in the North remained as centres of industrial production, 
others that had been deindustrialised became the destination for a limited amount of fresh 
industrial investment, attracted by the ready availability of labour desperate to find paid work, as 
well as government grants and loans, while still others became industrialised for the first time, 
typically associated with more specialised, higher-value-added and more knowledge-based 
production. At the same time, there has been some “re-shoring”, a limited shift of manufacturing, 
especially of consumer goods subject to strong fashion effects, back to locations nearer to markets, 
for example in central and eastern Europe. Similarly, there has been some limited “re-shoring” of 
more routine back office and data processing activities in call and contact centres, often to areas 
that had been deindustrialised, with substantial labour reserves as a consequence. 
Much more significantly, linked to the more general processes of financialisation, some places in the 
global North (London, New York, Tokyo) reinforced their position as centres of growth, enhancing 
their status as world cities, key nodes in global flows of capital, based on financial services and those 
activities related to knowledge production and key decision making by major corporations (Sassen, 
1991). A limited number of cities in the rising powers – such as Beijing – sought to join their ranks. 
These places became increasingly differentiated from, and unconnected with, the rest of their 
national economies and urban systems, disarticulated enclaves that were linked as nodes in 
networks with other global cities in other national jurisdictions, connected by and linking flows of 
capital, credit and information.  
Furthermore, these were places that were simultaneously characterised by deepening intra-urban 
socio-spatial divisions between the minority employed in high level and high-income corporate 
functions and the mass labour force, often including illegal as well as legal international migrant 
workers, employed in lower level services, and often at little more than – or less than - subsistence 
wage rates. Indeed, often there was a juxta-position between the residential areas of affluence and 
conspicuous consumption of those employed in the high-level corporate activities and the 
residential areas of those who serviced their demands, including inhabitants of what Manuel Castells 
(2010) has described as the emergent marginalised Fourth World. 
The marginalised spaces of the new ‘Fourth World’  
There is no doubt that economic growth has lifted many people in the South from poverty but at the 
same time the character of that growth has led to growing economic and social inequality between 
people and places in both North and South. Echoing an earlier conception of First, Second and Third 
Worlds, Castells (2010) conceptualises the increasing social exclusion and economic irrelevance of 
significant segments of society, areas of cities and regions and indeed entire countries as an 
emergent Fourth World. This world is a product of processes of socio-spatial differentiation that he 
sees as “present in literally every country and every city”. These processes are of course by no 
means new but have been sharply reinforced by market deregulation and the neo-liberal turn in 
public policies and in some cases by the emphasis on austerity policies post-2008. In sub-Saharan 
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Africa, in impoverished rural areas of south America and Asia, in the booming mega-cities of the 
South and the deindustrialised regions of the North and in national economies on its fringes such as 
Greece, there is graphic evidence of the (re)emergence of informal and illegal economies as people 
have sought ways to “get by” in places in which there is a grave shortage of paid work in the 
mainstream formal economy. Such places, and the people living in them, have become marginal to - 
or wholly detached from -  the major circuits of capital accumulation in the formal economy and 
more or less irrelevant to the political concerns of (supra)national states.  
Often such people have migrated to the booming urban centres from rural areas, based on the mis-
perception that well-paid jobs will be available to them in these places. In response to the lack of 
such jobs, and so housing that is affordable,  there has been a marked expansion of Informal and 
illegal housing settlements to provide rudimentary housing for people, some of whom are legal 
migrants, others of whom are illegal. They then seek or create work in a wide range of legal and 
illegal activities. These range from scavenging legally to working illegally in illegal activities - notably 
drug production and trafficking, and prostitution. Many of these activities are often environmentally 
polluting, which in turn degrades residential living spaces. These forms of economic activity 
represent an attempt to reconnect to the wider economy and escape marginality by creating 
“perverse connections”, links to the criminal and illegal economies, aiming to satisfy the “forbidden 
desires” and supply “outlawed commodities to [meet the] endless demand … from affluent societies 
and individuals” (Castells, 2010, 368).  
The growing significance of illegality in the mainstream global(ising) economy 
As I’ve suggested, one of the consequences of the global shift in industrial production in the context 
of neo-liberalising pressures was that the emergent industrial economies of the South became 
locked into a competition to attract industrial investment by engaging in a “race to the bottom”, 
with low regulatory standards in the labour market, in factories, mines and other workplaces, and in 
relation to health and safety and environmental standards. At the same time, competitive pressures 
- both those relating to people desperate for paid work and companies desperate for export orders - 
led to a widespread transgression of these regulatory limits (Sum and Ngai, 2005). There is also a 
great deal of literature from NGOs and charities which documents this in Bangladesh, China, India, 
Indonesia, Thailand, in much of eastern Europe and so on (for example, see the stream of reports 
from SOMO: see http://www.somo.nl/ ). It is worth noting, however, that these jobs were still seen 
as better than those in the rural areas from which many of these new industrial workers migrated. 
Now of course illegality is by no means new but what is now different is the way in which the legal 
and illegal have become symbiotically bound together so that success and survival in the formal legal 
economy depend more heavily upon relationships with illegal practices. The increasing influence of 
neoliberal thought leading to increasingly lightly regulated markets created space in which illegal 
practices could more easily flourish across the globalising economy, not least in the rising powers 
where corruption is endemic among economic and political élites. This is also creating new forms of 
connection among and between places in North and South. As a result of the proliferation of spaces 
in which illegality can flourish, the often minimal regulatory standards which national states adopted 
in the competition for mobile investment and which specified legal limits in relation to working 
conditions, hours of work, environmental pollution and so on, were - and are - frequently, often 
chronically, transgressed.  Illegality is now centrally involved and entwined in much of the new 
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mainstream (so-called) legal global economy and illegal working practices are a chronic feature of 
work over much of the global South and the economies of the rising powers. 
The growing prevalence of illegality often involves collusion by the state and “blind eyes” on the part 
of state regulators and officials in these countries, deliberately ignoring illegal practices as a 
necessary condition of economic activities located there remaining competitive (Hudson, 2014; 
2015). The economic and political élites of the rising powers are often deeply implicated in 
corruption and illegality. As a result, illegality in production in agriculture, in factories, in mines and 
so on, falling below the already low legal standards in terms of wages, hours of work, and health and 
safety is often the order of the day in much of the South. At times this results not simply in ill-being 
but in death, as industrial plant explodes, as at Bhopal, or factories collapse, or burn with workers 
trapped, locked inside, as at Rana Plaza in Bangladesh (Hudson, 2014). Similarly there is routine 
breaching of often minimal legal environmental regulations, leading to illegal environmental 
destruction and pollution, again at considerable cost to the health of both environment and people. 
Furthermore, in part a reflection of the lack of R&D capacity, there is often widespread violation of 
intellectual property rights as companies seek to upgrade production technologies and product 
quality. Illegal production encompasses theft of intellectual property and illegal copies of branded 
goods as well as the production of “knock offs”. The OECD (2007, cited in Chaudhry and Zimmerman, 
2010, 26) reports that an increasing number and range of products are being counterfeited so that 
“today nearly every consumer and industrial product is subject to counterfeiting”. Counterfeit goods 
account for about 7% of global trade, with two thirds of these originating in China alone (Glenny, 
2008; Phillips, 2005). Russia and some other south Asian and Latin American countries are also major 
sources of counterfeit production (Chaudhry and Zimmerman, 2010). 
There is a further dimension to the growth of illegality in the global economy which, while not 
directly a consequence of the ascendance of the rising powers, nonetheless impacts heavily upon 
them and is very much a result of the neo-liberalisation of economic policy and global capital 
markets that underpinned their emergence (Sikka, 2003). There are two aspects of this that are 
relevant here.  The first relates both to the growth in illegal flows of money and the laundering and 
sanitisation of money from the illegal economy to become part of the legal. The second aspect 
relates to the growth of illegal monetary practices within the formally legal economy (such as the 
widespread abuse of transfer pricing arrangements). The former account for about an estimated one 
third of flows into offshore accounts, the latter the remaining two thirds (Baker, 2005; McKinsey 
Global Institute, 2008).  
Money laundering is concentrated in Offshore Tax Havens, many of which are in the South, located 
on small island states, but many others are actually on-shore in the core capitalist territories of the 
North (Palan, 1999; Unger and Rawlings, 2008) so that it would be more accurate to drop the 
adjective “offshore”. They are no longer simply concerned with tax avoidance and evasion but with 
undermining and by-passing a broad range of regulations relating to the economy (Palan et al, 2010). 
OTHs were originally established as “spaces of exception” in which perfectly legal (though perhaps 
ethically and morally dubious) tax avoidance activities were permissible. As a result, they have 
become the sites of many financial transactions, an integral part of modern business practice in the 
neo-liberal globalising economy in which the rising powers of the South are prominent actors: it has 
been estimated that over 50% of international bank lending, approximately 33% of foreign direct 
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investment and 50% of global trade is routed on paper via offshore tax havens, figures out of all 
proportion to the 3% of world GDP for which they account.  
However, these spatially demarcated legal institutions that were granted special status and privilege 
“have been subverted to purposes for which they were never intended” (Christensen, 2011, 183). As 
a result, these tax havens allow, encourage and enable large scale corruption by providing an 
operational base for legal and financial professionals, and their clients, to exploit the limits to 
legislation and gaps within and between national systems of tax regulation.  Hidden behind a cloak 
of legal regulations, the legislative gaps are significant - while capital flows have become globally 
hypermobile, increasingly permissive regulatory systems remain largely based on national 
territories, allowing elaborate schemes to be devised to “weave dirty money” (Christensen, 2011, 
183) into commercial transactions and disguise the proceeds of crime and tax evasion. The bulk of 
money laundering operates via commercial transactions and investments in securities and transfers 
of funds in global financial markets. As a result, “dirty money” is laundered through complex multi-
jurisdictional ladders, exploiting the uneven development of and asymmetries among regulatory 
spaces, and operating through the global banking system in which tax havens are key locations.   
Once laundered, money can enter the circuits of the legal economy. It is estimated that at least two 
thirds of the money earned in the illegal economy and laundered in this way is immediately spent in 
the legal economy (Schneider and Enster, 2000). While the precise magnitude may be a matter for 
debate, the existence and significance of these flows is not. Some of this money is used to support 
livelihoods and enables increased commodity consumption in marginalised places. A much greater 
proportion becomes money capital, invested in diverse legitimate activities and spaces in 
mainstream markets. This both enhances the competitive position of those who own it and 
contributes systemically to the expanded reproduction of capital and to the sectoral and spatial 
distribution of growth, linking spaces of illegality and legality across North and South, East and West.  
Advanced capitalist states in the North (such as Switzerland,  the UK and USA) frequently collude in 
preventing the development of effective international regulation to tackle illegal financial flows and 
police financial flows into and out of tax havens, precisely because they play a pivotal role in the 
global accumulation process. Indeed, in lowering regulatory barriers and standards they have 
created the spaces in which such flows can flourish. It has been suggested that “virtually the entire 
international financial industry is heavily involved in money laundering” (Levin Report to the US 
Congress, 2001, cited in Palan et al, 2010, 72). It is therefore perhaps no great surprise that national 
states and multilateral agencies have largely downplayed concerns about “dirty money” and money 
laundering,  except, revealingly and significantly, in relation to drugs and terrorism, which account 
for only a small proportion of illegal cross-border flows. This discursive selectivity reflects a tacit 
recognition of the intimate relationships between legal and illegal activities in the routine 
constitution of contemporary capitalist economies and of the pivotal role of these tax havens as the 
spaces in which the financial flows between them takes place.  As Castells (2010, 172) puts it “[a]t 
the heart of the system is money laundering by the hundreds of billions (maybe trillions) of dollars. 
Complex financial schemes and international trade networks link up the criminal economy to the 
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formal economy, thus deeply penetrating financial markets and constituting a critical, volatile 
element in a fragile global economy.”2  
The fragility of this economy was graphically revealed by the global financial crisis that exploded in 
2008 and that still lingers on (Harvey, 2014; Kaletsky, 2010; Patterson, 2010). Furthermore, the 
growth of criminal activity and illegality has systemic implications for the anatomy and fragility of 
future capitalist development. Since criminal capital is involved in high-risk activities in markets in 
which the speed, volatility and volume of electronic market transactions has increased greatly, it 
both follows and amplifies speculative turbulence in international financial and capital markets, 
becoming an important source of market destabilisation. Paradoxically, the explosive growth of 
illegal monetary operations and money laundering is both central to the sustainability of the 
contemporary form of capitalism and at the same time threatens its future sustainability, not least 
the future growth of the rising powers (Hudson, 2015).  
 
Conclusions? 
These will inevitably to a degree be speculative. There is no doubt that the rising powers, the BRICS, 
and MINTs, have had a key role in shaping, directly and indirectly in various ways, the new 
geographies of the global economy. It remains to be seen whether this continues to be the case and 
whether the BRICS will become a significant collective actor in the global political economy, not least 
as the differences among them are growing rather than shrinking and trade relations among them 
are asymmetric and unequal. Nevertheless, in 2015 the BRICS finally launched their New 
Development Bank (with a capital of $US50 billion) and Contingent Reserve Arrangement (a $US 100 
billion reserve currency pool), institutions intended to rival the Northern-dominated IMF and World 
Bank. China in particular has had a pivotal role in these changes. As a result “… there seemed to be a 
slow tectonic shift in the power relations and geopolitical configuration of the global economy. The 
flow of wealth from East to West that had prevailed for two centuries was reversed and China 
increasingly became the centre of a global capitalism as the West, after the financial crisis of 2008, 
lost much of its momentum” (Harvey, 2014, 125-6). That said, by 2014 the gaps in average GDP per 
caput between the members of the G7 and the rising powers and other emerging economies 
remained significant (Table 1), although of course these averages conceal considerable and endemic 
income inequalities.   
These emergent geographies can therefore be seen as the latest expression of capitalist processes of 
combined and uneven development, involving complex links between changes at various spatial 
scales, internationally and intra-nationally, and with the emergence of a Fourth World evident to 
varying degrees more or less everywhere. There have been both “winners “and “losers” as a result 
of these processes and the rising powers in some ways can be seen as among the “winners”. In 
addition to China’s rise to become the world’s second largest economy, by 2013 Brazil, Russia and 
                                                          
2 In a rather different and even more worrying interpretation of the rise of illegal monetary flows and the 
indifference of major states in the North to them, Hudson (2015) suggests that these have been encouraged so 
as to permit the flow of illegal money into their banks, financial institutions and government bonds, thereby 
underpinning the position of the $US and £sterling and so enabling the military expenditures of the USA and 
UK states, and accepting that the resulting regulatory frameworks wil allow major corporations to escape 
taxation. While the expansion of illegal flows may have been facilitated by the rise of neoliberalism, illegal 
flows are much more deeply embedded in political-economic practices. 
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India were, respectively, the sixth, eighth and tenth largest global economies  – although that is not 
to say that all their inhabitants or places within them benefitted to the same extent from growth 
there. Quite the contrary, as intra-national and income inequalities deepened. However, one thing 
that we know about successful - in terms of the logic of capital accumulation - capitalist 
development is that it erodes the conditions that initially made success possible. So when will this 
erosion happen? And when it does, where will capital move its crisis tendencies around to next? 
Put another way, for how long will this particular economic geography prevail? As Anderson (2016, 
15) has recently noted, “The BRIC countries are in trouble. For a season the dynamo of international 
growth … they are now the leading source of anxiety in the headquarters of the IMF and World 
Bank”. This raises important questions as to whether the BRICS will be able to restore a trajectory of 
growth. For example, will the policies of the Chinese state address the issues of massive debt and 
succeed in restructuring the national economy, with more emphasis on production for the domestic 
market, on a more sectorally and spatially balanced economy, and on policies to move it up the 
value-chain to produce innovative and higher value-added commodities for export be successful?  
Conversely, at what point will the legacies of China’s one child policies erode the pool of cheap 
labour available there and so its attractiveness to capital as a site for labour-intensive production? 
While the policy has now been relaxed, so that couples can have a second child, less than 1 in 7 who 
could do so have chosen to do so over the last two years. And of course, other things being equal, a 
bigger population reduces GDP and income per caput. There is already evidence of slowing national 
economic growth in China, albeit still at levels that can only be dreamt of over much of the North. 
Even so, there has been evidence of wild-cat strikes at the factories of foreign companies such as 
Foxconn, Honda and Toyota (although there is a much longer history of labour disputes, especially in 
the Special Economic Zones, as Bowles and Dong, 1994, 61, note), pushing up wage costs and 
leading to production and new industrial investment moving from on-shore China to lower cost off-
shore production locations in other parts of south east Asia such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Vietnam, which continue to grow strongly (Sparton, 2016). What was not so long ago off-shore 
is now on-shore ….  
What about the trajectory of the economy in other rising powers? For example, there is a mountain 
of evidence of deep economic and political crises in Brazil. For a time a rather halting recovery from 
economic crisis on the back of redistributive policies boosting domestic demand, before the crisis 
again deepened as charges of corruption provoked a serious political crisis that became intertwined 
with the economic crisis, with the Brazilian economy shrinking again in 2015 by over 3% (Anderson, 
2016). Brazil’s continuing economic problems were also symptomatic of the asymmetrical economic 
relations among the rising powers, since they were in part a result of the slow-down in the Chinese 
economy and in its demands for raw material imports from Brazil and in part a result of growing 
competition from manufactured imports from China undercutting domestic Brazilian production. 
Having recovered from the crisis of 2007/8, the Russian and South African economies remain at best 
sluggish, with declining growth rates, at worst again mired in crisis. Having grown increasingly 
weakly, the Russian economy shrank by almost 3% in 2015 as oil prices plummeted, for example 
(Degaut, 2015). As a result exports from Northern economies to the rising powers have also 
declined: for example, in 2015 Germany’s exports to Russia fell by over 26%, to China by over 4% 
and to Brazil by 3% while growing strongly to the Eurozone, the UK and USA (Charter, 2106). And at 
the same time, there has been some - admittedly limited - “re-shoring” of certain types of industrial 
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and service investment from parts of the South to Europe and north America - activities, both 
manufacturing and services, that need to be nearer to markets while incurring more expensive 
production costs. So will there be industrial resurgence in these parts of the North? Will the new 
technologies of 3-d printing and additive manufacturing lead to a large-scale “re-shoring” of 
manufacturing activity and at the same time its wide dispersal within the North? 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it remains an open question as to whether their present 
difficulties are evidence of a secular trend or are simply conjunctural and whether any or all of the 
rising powers can manage a successful qualitative transformation of their economies onto a longer-
term trajectory of producing higher-value added commodities based on product innovation and 
skilled labour and the creation of markets for new commodities. Expressed slightly differently, 
recognising the variety of state economic strategies in these countries, which - if any - of them will 
manage to make this transition and disturb the political-economy geography of the global economy 
in more radical ways than they have done so far? What it is perhaps safe to say is that, for the 
foreseeable future, the rising powers, especially China and India, which by 2015 exceeded China’s 
national economic growth rate, will continue to have major impacts on the mainstream global 
capitalist economy and on patterns of global capital flows, production and trade. As Nölke et al 
(2015, 557, emphasis in original) note, the emergence of the rising powers cannot be divorced from 
their “selective integration into global production and trade networks” and as a result they “support 
global capitalism in general”. If nothing else, the size of their populations – and as a result their 
potential as markets and the mass of cheap labour available to capital there, although there are 
problems of widespread illiteracy and poverty in India in particular - will mean that China and India 
will continue to exert their influence on, and remain a constitutive integral part of, the global 
capitalist economy. Indeed it has been suggested by 2030 China and India together could account for 
no less than 38% of global gross investment and almost 50% of global investment in manufacturing 
(World Bank, 2013). More generally, Asian economies are widely predicted to grow at annual rates 
of 6-7% over the next two decades, roughly twice the growth rate of Northern economies. Whether 
such growth will be ecologically and socially sustainable is another matter. But while the precise 
figures as to growth rates may be debatable, they provide a powerful indication that the “slow 
tectonic shift in the power relations and geopolitical configuration of the global economy” is likely to 
continue and the political-economic significance of the parts of the East and South will continue to 
grow for the foreseeable future - but not necessarily unproblematically or indefinitely …  
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Table 1 Annual percentage GDP growth in selected countries, 2001-2014, and GDP per caput, 2014 
($US, current prices)    
                                                                                           GDP growth rate                                                                                         
GDP/caput 
Country 20
01 
20
02 
20
03 
20
04 
20
05 
20
06 
20
07 
20
08 
20
09 
20
10 
20
11 
20
12 
20
13 
20
14 
2014 
Banglad
esh 
5.1 3.8 47 5.2 6.5 6.7 7.1 6.0 5.0 5.6 6.5 6.5 6.0 6.1 1,08
7 
Brazil 1.3 3.1 1.2 5.7 3.1 4.0 6.0 5.0 -
0.2 
7.6 3.9 1.8 2.7 0.1 11,3
84 
China 8.3 9.1 10.
0 
10.
1 
11.
4 
12.
7 
14.
2 
9.6 9.2 10.
6 
9.5 7.8 7.7 7.3 7,59
0 
India 4.8 3.8 7.9 7.9 9.3 9.3 9.8 3.9 8.5 10.
3 
6.6 5.1 6.9 7.3 1,58
2 
Indones
ia 
3.6 4.5 4.8 5.0 5.7 5.5 6.3 6.0 4.6 6.2 6.2 6.0 5.6 5.0 3,49
2 
Mexico -
0.6 
0.1 1.4 4.3 3.0 4.9 3.2 1.4 -
4.7 
5.2 3.9 4.0 1.4 2.2 10,3
26 
Russian 
Federati
on 
5.1 4.7 7.3 7.3 6.4 8.2 8.5 5.2 -
7.8 
4.5 4.3 3.4 1.3 0.6 12,7
36 
South 
Africa 
2.7 3.7 2.9 5.8 4.3 5.6 5.4 3.2 -
1.5 
3.0 3.2 2.2 2.2 1.5 6,48
3 
Turkey -
5.7 
6.2 5.3 9.4 8.4 6.9 4.7 0.7 -
4.8 
9.2 8.8 2.1 4.2 2.9 10,5
15 
Vietna
m 
6.2 6.3 6.9 7.5 7.5 7.0 7.1 5.7 5.4 6.4 6.2 5.2 5.4 6.0 2,05
2 
                
France 2.0 1.1 0.8 2.8 1.6 2.4 2.4 0.2 -
2.9 
2.0 2.1 0.2 0.7 0.2 42,7
33 
German
y 
1.7 0.0 -
0.7 
1.2 0.7 3.7 3.3 1.1 -
5.6 
4.1 3.7 0.4 0.3 1.6 47,8
22 
Italy 1.8 0.3 0.2 1.6 0.9 2.0 1.5 -
1.0 
-
5.5 
1.7 0.6 -
2.8 
-
1.7 
-
0.4 
34,9
08 
Japan 0.4 0.3 0.2 1.6 0.9 2.0 1.5 -
1.0 
-
5.5 
4.7 -
0.5 
1.8 1.6 -
0.1 
36,1
94 
UK 2.8 2.5 3.8 2.5 3.0 2.7 2.6 -
0.5 
-
4.2 
1.5 2.0 1.2 2.2 2.9 46,3
32 
USA 1.0 1.8 2.8 3.8 3.3 2.7 1.8 -
0.3 
-
2.8 
2.5 1.6 2.3 2.2 2.4 54,6
30 
 
Source: World Bank Indicators, 2015, available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKKP.KD.ZG [downloaded 24/02/2016] 
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Table 2 Labour force (millions) in selected countries 
    2000   2013 
North 
France    26.7                                    30.0 
Germany   40.9                                    42.0 
Italy                    26.7                                    25.5 
Japan    68.3                                    65.6 
UK    29.9                                    32.8 
USA    144.7                                159.8 
‘South’ 
Bangladesh   69.2                77.3  
Brazil                                                79.7                                 108.4 
China               756.8                                  801.8 
Ethiopia                                           27.6                                    45.4 
India               450.9                                  487.9 
Indonesia                           101.8                                   122.1 
Mexico                 40.4                                     54.5 
Nigeria                 50.3                                     54.2 
Pakistan               51.7                                     63.6 
Philippines                                  31.9                                      42.9 
Russian Federation                      77.7                                      76.9 
Thailand                                         36.8                                      39.9 
Vietnam               40.4                                      54.4 
 
Source: World Bank, 2002 and 2015 
 
